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1. Introduction
Private property rights are widely advocated as a tool for 
creating sustainable fisheries. With enthusiastic espousal 
by economists, and widespread adoption by fisheries 
managers, the creation of private property is perhaps 
the archetypal fisheries panacea. Economists argue that 
private property rights will improve efficiency, increase 
profitability, and lead to sustainable harvesting of marine 
resources (Grafton et al., 1996; Scott and Shotton, 2000). 
Others, however, have pointed out myriad issues, par-
ticularly social, that these policies create (Carothers and 
Chambers, 2012; Bromley, 2009), leading to calls for a 
more holistic approach to fisheries policy, integrating the 
insights of ecologists, sociologists, biologists, anthropolo-
gists and geographers (Degnbol et al., 2006; Cardwell and 
Thornton, 2015).
In this paper, we address the particularly legal problem 
created by private property rights, which contribute to 
these rights being inflexible, easily captured, and poten-
tially incompatible with a precautionary approach to har-
vesting from uncertain and dynamic ecosystems (Copes, 
1998; Phillips et al., 2002; Acheson et al., 2015; Bromley, 
2009). To facilitate our analysis, we use an empirical case 
study of the informal individual tradable quota (ITQ) sys-
tem in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (henceforth UK) to illustrate some of these poten-
tial negative impacts.
The UK experience illustrates that one of the most 
significant problems with private property rights 
systems is the way that they can limit the manage-
ment powers of government by reducing the range 
of possible policy interventions (see also Eagle, 2007; 
Bradshaw, 2004a, 2004b). This effect is because prop-
erty rights are subject to existing legal frameworks, 
such as human rights law, which serve to circumscribe 
how governments are able to intervene in manage-
ment and distribution. The principle effect of property 
rights is that once they are created, they cannot be 
taken away by the state:
 – without due process;
 – such a “taking” must be in the public interest; and
 – without paying compensation at market value.
Once established, property rights can therefore signifi-
cantly limit the options of managers.
The means of property creation stem from simple 
mechanisms such as selling some sort of right over the 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the 
problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries
Thomas Appleby*, Emma Cardwell† and Jim Pettipher‡
Property rights are a widely advocated policy tool to encourage stewardship over a range of environ-
mental goods. Despite the extent to which property rights are dependent upon law to work, economists 
rarely consider that property rights are enmeshed within a complex web of pre-existing national and 
international legal frameworks—such as human rights law—that put strict limitations on the way they 
operate. This important issue is illustrated here with reference to the legal struggles in the UK around 
the “ownership” of fishing rights. The social and economic changes under market-based management 
in the UK made the fisheries regulatory regime unpopular, and undoubtedly contributed to the over-
whelming vote within the catch sector to leave the European Union, even though the responsibility to 
allocate fishing opportunities to the British fishing industry lay with the UK authorities. The lesson 
from the UK experience is that despite the legal-blindness of much resource economics, the application 
of economic theory should not outrun its legal foundations. We conclude that promoting the alloca-
tion of public fishing rights to the private sector without adequate safeguards—such as a valuation 
of the rights in question and carefully considered written terms and conditions—could be considered 
negligent.
Keywords: Fisheries; fisheries management; market based environmental policy; property rights; property 
law; ITQ
* University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
† University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK
‡ Green and Gold, Ross on Wye, UK
Corresponding author: Emma Cardwell (e.cardwell@lancaster.ac.uk)
Appleby et al: Fishing rights, human rightsArt. 40, page 2 of 14  
resource (such as a licence, lease, use right, privilege, or 
franchise—all of which mean the same thing)  to more 
arcane processes under constitutional law, human rights 
law or under the public law doctrines such as “legitimate 
expectation”. All of these mechanisms operate in the same 
way and safeguard the implicit promises made by the 
state that it will not interfere with individual proprietary 
rights. The use of multiple legal terms over the years (for 
instance, see Phear, 1859, p 67) mask a binary situation, 
where either rights have been created by the state, which 
it cannot remove without compensating the rights holder 
to the value of those rights (for the purposes of clarity we 
have called them “individual rights”), or else those rights 
are exercisable by the public at large (“public rights”), 
where no compensation is due.
Further difficulties arise because it is quite possible 
for the state to create individual rights by accident. This 
possibility stems from a function of the rule of law and 
the courts, particularly in common law jurisdictions, to 
curb the power of the state. The effect is that through a 
course of dealings, permissions granted by public author-
ities can become individual rights. The difficulty is that 
there is no hard-and-fast rule as to what is or is not an 
individual right, and one impact of this legal “grey area” 
is that it further limits the operation of active manage-
ment. The threat of litigation, even on relatively thin legal 
grounds, makes it hard for public administrators to make 
transformative decisions. Paradoxically, continuing with 
the status quo tends to strengthen legal arguments that 
the rights over the resource have been propertized into 
individual rights and are thus locked-in under the prop-
erty rights regime. In the case of fisheries, where adapt-
ability to environmental, social and economic shock is 
vital for the long-term resilience of both ecosystems and 
economic communities, legal lock-in can cause serious 
problems, and is inherently incompatible with adaptive 
management. This incompatibility suggests that if we 
want to avoid unwieldy and ineffective panaceas, knowl-
edge of law is a vitally important arrow in any nation’s 
fisheries management quiver.
The UK, with its unwritten constitution and complex 
constitutional settlement, is a good example of the dan-
gers of unintended lock-in, potentially one of the most 
significant side effects of the property-rights panacea. 
This case study presents an example of how, without 
proper design, property rights systems can become legally 
enmeshed within national or international human rights 
law, serving to circumscribe how governments are able to 
intervene in management and distribution.
As property rights grow in popularity as a fisheries man-
agement tool, particularly in the global south, where the 
culture of constitutionalism may be less defined, it is vital 
that governments are made aware of the ways in which 
their hands can be bound by poorly designed regulation. 
And, as property rights become increasingly popular in 
environmental policy beyond fisheries (such as pollution 
reduction and biodiversity conservation), policy makers 
must be aware of pre-existing legal structures, and how 
these could substantially decrease their ability to govern 
vulnerable ecological systems.
1.1 The UK context
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland is a cluster of islands in the northeast Atlantic, at 
its northernmost point approximately 400 miles south of 
the Arctic Circle. The Republic of Ireland is the only coun-
try with which it shares a land border. As an archipelago, 
the UK has claimed a large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
(Great Britain, 2013) and, in part thanks to a wide conti-
nental shelf, enjoys relatively rich fishing opportunities. 
The UK also has jurisdiction over its Overseas Territories 
and Crown Dependencies, but they will not be examined 
in this paper.
The UK is currently a member of the European Union 
(EU), which has “exclusive competence” for the fisheries 
policy of its members (Commission v United Kingdom Case 
804/79; Eur-Lex, 2018) and manages UK waters as part of 
the larger “common pond” which allows reciprocal access 
rights to the waters of other European nations under 
article 5 of EU Regulation 1380/2013 (European Union, 
2013a).1 The EU has delegated rights for the UK to control 
access to its waters to the 6 nautical-mile limit. In England 
these inshore waters are managed by Inshore Fisheries 
and Conservation Authorities (successors to Sea Fisheries 
Committees), and in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland 
inshore waters are managed by the devolved administra-
tions (DAs).
Until now, in return for shared access to much of the 
EU’s waters (some 25 million km2),2 the UK has agreed 
to limit the catches of its fleet relative to other EU mem-
ber states (at the time of their entry) under a doctrine 
known as “relative stability” (Churchill and Owen, 2009, 
p 154). This term is calculated on a stock-by-stock basis 
and relates to the landings of each species. The quanti-
fied fishing opportunities for each stock for each mem-
ber state (known as total allowable catch, or TAC) are 
agreed at the EU level. Each member state is given a set 
amount as a TAC, which it then distributes to its fishing 
businesses using its own domestic laws (which must be 
compliant to the general principles in EU law; see p 25 in 
United Kingdom of Fish Producer Organisations (UKAFPO) 
v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs [2013] England & Wales Administrative Court 1959 
(Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2018). UK-registered ves-
sels are also required to have an “economic link” to the UK 
(Churchill and Owen, 2009, p 202–210), but this require-
ment has not stopped the acquisition of UK vessels by 
foreign companies. Data from 2009 recorded 9% of UK 
quota by value being held by foreign-flagged vessels and 
16% of landings by weight accruing to these vessels (Vivid 
Economics, 2009). Greenpeace has estimated that nearly 
half of English and Welsh quota is owned by foreign com-
panies (McClenaghan and Boros, 2016).
The UK has the second largest fishing fleet in Europe 
after Spain (measured by gross tonnage) and the fourth 
most powerful (measured by aggregate engine power) 
(Marine Management Organisation, 2017). In terms of 
vessel numbers, the majority of UK vessels are small-scale 
(79% are under 10 m in length) but the tonnage and value 
of catches of this small-scale sector are dwarfed by the 
minority of large-scale boats, with the large-scale sector 
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responsible for approximately 89% of the UK catch by 
value.
2. Producer Organisations and the origin of 
the UK transferable quota system
In UK waters (around 770,000 km2) fishing operates under 
the ancient public right to fish (Appleby, 2005) which per-
mits all UK citizens (and currently, presumably, by exten-
sion EU citizens through UK membership of the EU) to 
fish its waters. The vessels are licensed under section 4 of 
the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act (Great Britain, 1967) and 
article 7 of CFP Regulation 1224/2009 (European Union, 
2009). Upon exit from the EU, these regulations are set to 
continue until repealed by the UK government or the DAs. 
Because of the complexity of devolution, there is a con-
cordat on vessel licensing and quota distribution between 
the four nations’ administrations (The Administrations, 
2016), although there are wide differences between 
the management in Scotland and the rest of the UK 
(The Sunday Times, 2014).
There is no ongoing charge for fishing licences in the UK, 
though “entitlements” to licences (which are distinct from 
quota, as they relate to the entitlement to a vessel licence 
rather than the quota itself, which sits on that licence) are 
bought and sold and even aggregated, as new licences are 
not currently being issued (Scottish Government, 2015). 
Prior to May 2015 fishing licences were renewed peri-
odically. However, the Marine Management Organisation, 
which has considerable responsibility for English fisheries, 
has now announced the removal of the fixed date from 
fishing vessel licences (Marine Management Organisation, 
2015).
As outlined above, upon accession to the EU, the UK 
pooled the management of its fishery under the EU’s 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). TACs were first introduced 
for UK vessels for pelagic species by the North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission in 1974, then extended to other key 
stocks with the introduction of the CFP in 1983. At first, 
the UK government managed TAC allocations centrally 
by setting monthly landings limits for fishing vessels. At 
this time a number of large-scale operators were grouped 
into regional fish marketing organisations called producer 
organisations (POs). Shortly after accession to the CFP, the 
PO for Shetland, a group of remote islands in the north-
ern North Sea (the most northerly point of the UK) asked 
if they could manage the annual TAC for their members 
locally. This devolved management was then gradually 
spread around the country, with POs taking management 
control of their members’ shares of national TAC.
Fishing businesses in the UK are therefore now grouped 
in two categories. Under 10 m (small-scale) vessels, which 
are not in membership of a recognised PO, are managed 
directly by the government fisheries administration, and 
are allocated quota monthly via a shared community 
“pool”. Over 10 m vessels can either join a PO, and have 
their quota allocations managed by the PO, or remain out-
side the PO system and be directly licensed. Over time, the 
number of vessels in the over 10 m “non sector” (non-PO) 
has dwindled to 442 of the 1229 large-scale vessels flying 
the UK flag. Under 10 m vessels are allowed to join a PO, 
but if they do so, they lose their right to fish from the gov-
ernment-administrated under 10 m quota pool. Currently, 
of the 4,299 under 10 m vessels in the UK fleet, 53 are 
on the vessel lists as in PO membership (Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [DEFRA], 2018).
Since 1985, the amount of UK TAC managed by POs has 
been slowly increasing, and by 2015 approximately 94% 
of quota by tonnage was under PO control. This percent-
age includes both the quota held by a PO’s members that 
is managed by that PO, and the quota a PO may hold in 
its own right as a corporate entity. The government allows 
POs to determine their own methods of quota allocation, 
though of course the opinions of members, particularly 
those with substantial holdings, play an integral part in 
management decisions. Management varies from organi-
sation to organisation, with some POs pooling quota 
between their members and setting monthly limits, oth-
ers allocating individual quota, and some using a combi-
nation of both. Until 1996, quota shares of TAC could not 
be transferred between POs. After that date, these rules 
were relaxed, and an informal market—both facilitated, 
and officially denied by, an ambivalent government (see 
Cardwell, 2012)—for quota was established.
The allocation of quota was originally based on a track 
record, which was attached to a vessel’s (not its crew’s) 
landings (or “catch history”) on a three year rolling period. 
To allocate quota, a catch history record of (say) 100 
tonnes of cod would be converted into a fixed quota allo-
cation of 1000 FQA units of cod at 100 kg per unit. Each 
unit then changes in terms of weight depending on the 
UK’s annually agreed allocation of TAC at the EU level. 
The process of rolling allocations was later recognised as 
encouraging a “race for fish” as each vessel tried to maxim-
ise its landings to maintain future quota. The rolling track 
record was therefore replaced in 1999 with fixed quota 
allocations (FQAs) based on the three years from 1994 to 
1996 (Marine Socio-Economics Partnership, 2014). The 
shift from allocating quota based on a rolling track record 
to FQAs made trading much easier. As this market devel-
oped, more POs switched to individual quota manage-
ment, or allowed their members to purchase individual 
quota to top up their pool allocations.
This development led to an unusual situation whereby 
POs (purchasing FQAs for collective use) and their mem-
bers (purchasing FQAs for individual use) are often com-
petitors on the UK FQA market. As POs are both officially 
non-profit organisations, and dependent on member-
ship fees for their income—and the fees paid are largely 
dependent on the amount of quota held by a member, 
this situation can lead to perverse incentives for POs not 
to purchase quota for community use, and risk alienat-
ing powerful members. If a PO has a member with large 
quota holdings, as POs are paid for quota management, 
that company will provide a significant proportion of the 
PO’s income. When FQAs for certain species come on the 
market, there is an incentive for the PO manager not to 
bid against the interests of members on whom they are 
financially dependent. Furthermore, the PO could even be 
prevented from bidding against its members altogether, 
as the more powerful of these (those with larger quota 
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holdings) tend to be represented on the PO’s board, which 
employs and dictates terms to the PO manager. This situ-
ation has exacerbated the trend for FQAs to be purchased 
for individual, rather than collective, use in the UK.
As quota trading has increased, the regional nature of 
POs has decreased, and with some exceptions under par-
ticular geographic circumstances (such as Shetland and 
Fife PO, the membership of which remain regional) fisher-
men can now ‘shop around’ for the quota management 
regime that suits them best. Although transferability is 
now a key aspect of the UK’s quota scheme overall, sig-
nificant differences still exist in both the membership and 
management styles of the different POs.
3. Government ambivalence and ownership 
ambiguity: FQAs as possessions
The informal way in which quota trading has developed 
in the UK means that the Government has always had a 
somewhat ambiguous relationship with the market. This 
ambiguity culminated in a court-battle between the gov-
ernment and industry in 2013, which was focused on the 
extent to which FQAs could be considered private prop-
erty (UKAFPO v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs [2013]; Courts and Tribunals Judici-
ary, 2018) The complexity of this case hinged on the fact 
that since the earliest days of the system, the UK govern-
ment has flip-flopped between censuring trading (by stat-
ing fixed quota allocations should not be transferred) and 
recognising and facilitating trading (through periodically 
reconciling quota holdings to take transfers into account).
The gradual shift towards a transferable quota market in 
the UK can be largely seen as one of confused and piece-
meal administration, rather than an intentional move to 
increase efficiency or protect stocks. Quotas progressively 
became more transferable as this was expedient for the 
POs that managed FQAs, particularly in the lean years with 
a restrictive European TAC, rather than due to a particular 
governmental ideology. Despite the active involvement of 
the POs in the development of the system (with govern-
ment “industry consultation” almost always being limited 
to interactions with POs) the path to transferability should 
not be categorised as a simple, rational decision made col-
lectively by the industry. Notwithstanding their adminis-
trative clout, the POs account for only a small proportion 
(15%) of the UK fleet, and little say has so far been given 
to fishers outside of PO membership in management deci-
sions. A study conducted in 2001, shortly after FQAs were 
introduced, found that many UK fishermen were actually 
against the idea of fully transferable quota, even if they 
also considered it inevitable (Hatcher et al., 2002).
The blind-man’s-buff manner in which the UK has 
moved towards transferable fishing rights has led to con-
siderable uncertainty arising about the “property” status 
of FQAs. Kevin and Susan Gray highlight three key aspects 
of a property right (Gray and Gray, 2009, p 91):
• Immunity from summary cancellation or extinguish-
ment – the right cannot be immediately curtailed by 
government or third parties;
• Presumptive right to exclude others – the right per-
mits the holder to manage the asset and excludes 
other from using it; and
• The right to prioritise resource values – the holder can 
choose whether to exercise their right or not, or to sell 
or rent the right to others.
These “sticks in the bundle” (Hohfeld, 1917) are the key 
legal features of property. When the UK set about creating 
its quota system, the nature and extent of these “sticks” 
were not properly defined. At the time, an exasperated 
House of Commons Select Committee (1999) complained 
of the need for “clear guidance on the legal title to licences 
and quota in the context of transactions between individu-
als and/or organisations.” However, the UK Government 
ducked the issue and responded later to the Committee:
“There are no plans to change the existing position 
whereby licences and quotas apply at the discretion 
of the Minister but with fishermen’s interest pro-
tected by the legal concept of legitimate expectation” 
(Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, 1999).
Any property lawyer would instantly respond that, in a 
rights-based market, it is vital that the nature of those 
rights is properly known. Questions such as: “when can 
the right be terminated?”; “How long does the right last?”; 
“Can it be sold?” “Is there a resource rent or licence fee?” 
are critical.
Instead, the UK system developed on an ad hoc basis, 
and fundamental terms that should have been defined 
ab initio were left to develop with no proper deliberation 
or legal counsel. Assuring the parties that quota was pro-
tected by the “legal concept of legitimate expectation” 
gave some measure of protection from summary cancel-
lation to FQA holders. Where a public body has given an 
expectation that a practice will continue to an individual 
who will retain some benefit (in this case the allocation of 
quota and licences), then a failure to meet that expecta-
tion will be an actionable breach of law (R v North East 
Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] Queen’s 
Bench 213 [Court of Appeal]; Westlaw, 2018a). Quota 
grants with it the right to exclude others (non-quota 
holders cannot land fish), either through state sanction 
by fines or through the operation of POs, who can take 
civil action against members who have not complied with 
their quota obligations. It also grants the right to prioritise 
its value – particularly when quota is used as collateral or 
sold or rented.
To add to this confusion, FQA trades were taxed in the 
2000s for capital gains tax purposes (Fullarton v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [2004] Simon’s Tax Cases 207; 
Westlaw, 2018b). In 2007, in the context of the decommis-
sioning of vessels, vessel owners were able to keep their 
quota, without it being attached to a vessel. The govern-
ment reasoning behind this ability was that the quota 
“was not ours to take back” (House of Commons, 2007). 
So, while the UK government on the one hand professed 
that quota remained in public ownership, at the same time 
it was maintaining, at least at some level, that quota had 
become some form of individual right. The billion-pound 
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question is: “which of the opposing government views is 
correct?” (Appleby et al., 2016).
The system certainly appears to have engendered wide-
spread acceptance of FQAs as an individual right by those 
in the industry. This perception was supported by the com-
mon practice of banks accepting FQA holdings as collat-
eral for loans. The House of Commons Select Committee 
on Agriculture (1999, p 85), struggling to understand the 
legal status of the quota system after the shift to FQA, said:
“The sense of ownership resulting from the pur-
chase of quota is somewhat misleading as the legal 
owner of licences and of quota remains the UK 
Government.”
At this time, only shortly after the introduction of FQA, 
quota and vessel licences were valued at over £1 billion. 
The Select Committee recorded deep disquiet over the 
trades of quota from within the industry, but also some 
support. They noted the fatalism with which the shift to 
market allocation had been accepted as both inevitable 
and irreversible:
“Most representatives of the fishing industry voiced 
their strong disapproval of the trade but also their 
acknowledgment that it had now become “a rec-
ognised and accepted practice which cannot be 
stopped because of the amount of money which has 
changed hands”.”
4. The performance of transferable FQAs: 
evaluating distribution, disclosure and 
democracy without transparency
A concentration of the fishing fleet into fewer hands is a 
well-documented outcome of the introduction of trans-
ferable fishing rights. Currently, 94% of 2017 UK TAC by 
tonnage is allocated to the 845 over 10 m vessels (and 57 
under 10 m) that are members of UK POs, representing 
approximately 15% of the UK fleet. The remaining 85% 
of the fleet (4,649 boats) have just 6% of the UK’s 2017 
TAC tonnage available to them as fishing opportunities, of 
which only 1.8% is allocated to them (DEFRA, 2017).
Until recently, it was impossible to scrutinise the own-
ership of the UK fishing fleet much beyond these aggre-
gate numbers. Although transfers have been officially 
recognised since trading began, there was no official or 
public record of quota holdings in the UK until late 2013 
(Her Majesty’s [HM] Government, 2015). Under Fisheries 
Minister Richard Benyon, the UK government introduced 
the requirement that privately held FQA fishing opportu-
nities should be recorded and published. Until that point, 
the industry and members of the public were effectively 
shut out of any access to information on this particular 
aspect of fisheries management, making proper analysis of 
the impacts of the transferable FQA system very difficult.
The relatively recent publication of this quota register 
means that it is only now becoming possible to highlight 
anomalous holdings of fishing opportunities. However, 
though the register represents a significant improvement 
for transparency, it still has notable flaws. The current 
system lists separate registered quota holdings and hold-
ers, but it does not identify (or require POs to identify) 
who the ultimate controlling parties for these quota hold-
ings are. Following the money beyond the PO holdings 
listed, our research suggests that after 15 years of transfer-
able rights, the vast majority of English POs have either 
one or two members holding 50% or more of their FQA 
holdings, giving them controlling stakes in those organi-
sations. Until recently, this information was not only 
unavailable to the public, but also the government and 
industry as a whole, leaving quota management predomi-
nantly under very little, if any, government scrutiny and 
denying government the proper information necessary to 
either evaluate or manage the quota system.
This lack of scrutiny, both official and public, is sympto-
matic of the UK’s relationship with the POs that drive the 
management of UK fishing quota. The extent to which the 
UK’s recognition and regulation of POs is in accord with 
European Community law is questionable. For example, 
a number of the more recently recognised POs appear to 
have a single ultimate controlling and owning party—put 
simply, these are “producer organisations” that manage 
the quota holdings of just one fishing company. This situ-
ation appears to explicitly contravene the intentions of 
the EU Regulation 1380/2013 (European Union, 2013a) 
and its subsidiary, the common organisation of the mar-
kets in fishery and aquaculture products regulation (com-
monly known as the “CMO Regulation”) (European Union, 
2013b).
Articles 6.1. and 6.2. of the CMO Regulation read:
1. Fishery producer organisations and aquaculture pro-
ducer organisations (“producer organisations”) may be 
established on the initiative of producers of fishery or 
aquaculture products in one or more Member States 
and recognised in accordance with Section II.
2. Where relevant, the specific situation of small-scale 
producers shall be taken into account when establish-
ing producer organisations.
Article 6.1 therefore specifically requires that a PO rep-
resents multiple producers (the sentence does not read 
“on the initiative of a producer of fishery or aquaculture 
products…”). Furthermore, the requirement at Article 6.2 
does not seem to accord with a regulatory regime that 
enables the UK’s 22 of the 233 recognised fishery POs to 
exclude the vast majority of its fishing fleet – specifically, 
the small-scale fleet – from 94% of its fishing opportuni-
ties. For example, with regard to the regulation of already 
recognised fishery POs, Article 18.1 reads:
“Member States shall carry out checks at regular 
intervals to verify that producer organisations and 
inter-branch organisations comply with the con-
ditions for recognition laid down in Articles 14 
[specifies ongoing recognition criteria for producer 
organisations] and 16 [specifies ongoing recogni-
tion criteria for “inter branch organisations”] respec-
tively. A finding of non-compliance may result in the 
withdrawal of recognition.”
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The reference in Article 18.1 to Article 14 of the CMO 
requires Member States to check recognised POs’ compli-
ance with eligibility criteria relating first to the “internal 
functioning of producer organisations” which includes at 
17(d) a requirement that a PO has “a democratic function-
ing that enables the members to scrutinise their organisa-
tion and its decisions”. It is not clear how this scrutiny can 
be achieved by a recognised PO that has a single ultimate 
controlling party which holds the only vote, as is the case 
with some of the UK’s POs.
The structure of the UK POs also raises cause for concern 
in respect of competition law. Article 14.1 (f) of the CMO 
states that Member States may recognise as POs all groups 
set up on the initiative of fishery or aquaculture produc-
ers which apply for such recognition, provided that they 
comply with certain competition rules and do not abuse 
a dominant position on a given market. With 94% of all 
FQAs allocated to the minority of PO members, it is clear 
that the current system creates remarkably powerful, indi-
vidual commercial enterprises within the PO structures. 
Whether this creation has resulted in (or from) abuses of a 
dominant position in the market remains to be seen, but 
it should be remembered that fishing quota has raised 
issues of competition law for many years (Barback, 1976).
Article 14.1 (h) of the CMO further states that:
“Member States may recognise as producer organi-
sations all groups set up on the initiative of fishery or 
aquaculture producers which apply for such recog-
nition, provided that they… provide relevant details 
of their membership, governance and sources of  
funding.”
Despite the powerful position of POs in fisheries manage-
ment, neither the UK government, nor the DAs, have ever 
asked for these details.
The UK government has recently begun to actively try 
to address these representative and quota imbalances. 
This effort began with the attempts to rebalance unused 
quota after the UK government won the UKAFPO case 
and has recently included the UK government officially 
recognising the Coastal PO, which at the time of recog-
nition had already recruited 254 small-scale fisher mem-
bers. The Coastal PO is a fishery PO specifically designed 
to represent the small-scale boats—more than 75% of the 
UK fleet—that until now have not enjoyed the benefits of 
membership of an officially recognised PO. However, the 
Coastal PO’s success will be dependent on the UK govern-
ment providing small-scale fishers with increased access 
to quota through it. If small-scale fishers cannot make a 
viable living though their membership of the PO, they will 
not continue to support it.
Notwithstanding moves by the UK government (and 
similar moves in Scotland) to redress the balance, the cur-
rent poor recognition and regulation of POs means that 
the ultimate control of traded fishing rights is not neces-
sarily held within the industry. Fish producers are defined 
in the CMO along with other relevant terms, but no direct 
link is made stating that fishing opportunities should only 
be available to fish producers (fishers). This absent link 
creates the opportunity for middlemen, such as holding 
companies and agents, to hold quota primarily as a form 
of capital with the aim of financial accumulation—these 
are known derisorily in the business as “slipper skippers.”
For example, let us consider the case from the DEFRA 
online register4 of FQAs of the South Western Fish PO’s 
member N C Trawlers and its 25,873 FQAs, which are 
recorded on the register against licence number 9031, 
the holding type of which is identified as “Fishing Vessel 
Licensee in membership of PO” and recorded as associated 
with vessel name, “Provider II”.
For accuracy and transparency, this entry in the register 
should be amended to reflect that N C Trawlers is in fact 
N.C. Trawlers Limited, Company number 03052127, and 
the vessel name needs to be removed as the company no 
longer owns or uses that vessel for actively fishing (the 
August 2017 DEFRA register of fishing vessels now identi-
fies the only “Provider II” as a member of the Cornish Fish 
PO). Whoever supplies the information to the register has 
amended the “licence type” to a “dummy” licence, which 
suggests that it is not connected to an active fishing vessel 
or licence.
Given that N.C. Trawlers Limited appears to be in the 
business of holding quota but not actively fishing, does N 
C Trawlers meet the regulatory criteria to (a) hold fishing 
opportunities or (b) be a fish producer member of a recog-
nised fish producer organisation? The answer is unclear. 
How many other, similar entries does the register include? 
That is also unclear.
What is evident, however, is that either the UK’s regula-
tory regime is not picking up the obvious irregularities in 
the published register or the UK government is picking 
them up and choosing not to act on them.
Moreover, it is possible to pay lip service to the rules 
and still operate a quota trading company, as can be seen 
through the operation of fishing vessel E538, the Nina 
May. The Nina May is 4.8 m long. In August 2017, the 
Nina May held 5% of the Cod allocation in sea area 7a, 
and between 10 and 20% of the fishing opportunities for 
plaice, whiting and sole in a number of other sea areas. 
In fact, the Nina May held 26% of the UK’s opportuni-
ties to fish for sole in sea area 7a alone. It is extremely 
unlikely that, given the dimensions of the vessel, Nina 
May could ever hope to land even a small tithe of that 
catch. It may be convenient for the Nina May to hold 
quota on behalf of other vessels held by the same owner, 
but this convenience leads to another significant change 
in the fleet. Traditionally quota was allocated to owner 
operators. Now, ownership has consolidated and UK fish-
ing businesses increasingly hire skippers and crew who 
have no stake in the vessel or the quota, casting doubt on 
the claim that property rights encourage stewardship (van 
Putten et al., 2014).
The examples above show both how complicated the 
ownership (and use) of quota in the UK has become and 
how difficult and onerous it can be for governments 
in a transferable quota system to keep track of where 
exactly quota holdings are, and who is controlling them. 
The monthly vessel lists that DEFRA publishes do record 
(some) of the vessels in PO membership, but do not 
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identify their owners, the ultimate controlling parties or 
the persons with significant control. From a legal perspec-
tive, regulators should require the POs to provide that 
vital information, as it is the owner (not the vessel) that is 
the PO member.
5. Impediments to change and legal lock-in
Another key issue for policy makers in this area is that 
the creation of property type rights brings with it certain 
constraints of which many legislators may not be aware—
particularly where the creation process of the right is 
informal. In the UK, there is a legal adage that “Parliament 
cannot bind its successors.” This adage is explained by 
Dicey (1959, p. 68) as follows:
“The logical reason why Parliament has failed in its 
endeavours to enact unchangeable enactments is 
that a sovereign power cannot, while retaining its 
sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any 
Parliamentary enactment.”
So, in theory, should Parliament wish to alter the alloca-
tion of fishing quota because of any dysfunctionality in 
the structure of rights created, the process should be 
straightforward. But there is a limit on the capricious 
exercise of sovereign powers through human rights law, 
which creates an internationally accepted framework on 
the extent of sovereign power, as former Lord Chief Jus-
tice Tom Bingham (Bingham, 2010, p 83) said:
“[T]he rule of law requires that the law affords ade-
quate protection of fundamental human rights. It is 
a good start for public authorities to observe the let-
ter of the law, but not enough if the law in a particu-
lar country does not protect what are there regarded 
as the basic entitlements of a human being.”
One of the cornerstones of human rights legislation in 
the UK is Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (1950) (Council of Europe, 2018a) 
which states:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall 
be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of international 
law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any 
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws 
as it deems necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest or to secure 
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penal-
ties.”
This puts strict limits on the UK government’s powers 
to interfere with its citizens’ “possessions”. Such inter-
ference usually requires specific powers enabling the 
acquisition of the property right, the payment of com-
pensation (James v United Kingdom [1986] European 
Court of Human Rights 21; Council of Europe, 2018b) 
and significant justification on the grounds of public 
interest. In the USA there is a similar provision under the 
5th Amendment:
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
Our intent is not to discuss the rights and wrongs of fun-
damental constitutional protections for property rights, 
but there is a pressing problem in the UK for public fish-
eries administrators. For nearly all property, it is clear 
whether the property is an individual right or not. Land, 
goods and even intellectual property have been relatively 
well defined over the centuries. The recent arrival of fish-
ing quota, “entitlements”, vessel licences and days at sea 
regulation (to name the most common licensing arrange-
ments for fishers) means that there are serious questions 
as to whether these are individual rights or not, whether 
the government of the day can interfere with them and, if 
so, what are the terms of any compensation due and what 
is the process.
If they are not “possessions” but fishers operate under 
some form of public right, fisheries administrators may 
change their allocation policy and even the legislation in 
whatever manner they see fit. If they have become indi-
vidual right then the public authority is effectively pow-
erless to intervene without paying compensation. Given 
the potential value of fishing quota, such compensation 
payments could be huge, as the UK’s fishing rights were 
valued at over £1 billion ($1.35 billion) in 2016 (Appleby 
et al., 2016). As a result it is challenging for commentators 
to justify the “track record” method of originally allocat-
ing FQA units in the UK, which resulted in the gifting of 
quota and other fishing rights to individual fishing busi-
nesses who just happened to be in the right place at the 
right time. No safeguards were put in place to ensure that 
proper value was paid in recompense to the public for 
the loss of their right, nor was there any proper contem-
plation of how the market in any tradable rights created 
would work.
Where quota was allocated to members of POs, there 
do not appear to have been any checks on how this wind-
fall benefit has been divided among the members, or on 
their performance.5 This problem is not restricted to the 
UK. When limited access privilege fishing rights were 
granted in the US under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 2007 (National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, 2018) it 
was expressly stated that:
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“[the Act] shall not confer any right of compensation 
to the holder of such limited access privilege, quota 
share, or other such limited access system authoriza-
tion if it is revoked, limited, or modified.”
However, whether even that statutory attempt to limit 
compensation has been successful remains to be seen 
(Eagle, 2007; Weiss, 1992), and falls beyond the scope of 
this paper.
Problematically for managers, the development of the 
nature and shape of the property rights in UK quota 
has been driven by the courts. In the cases of R (ex parte 
Quark Fishing Limited) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs Law Reports, Appeal Cases 
(Third Series) [2006] 1 House of Lords (Westlaw, 2018c), 
Quark Fishing Limited lost its licence to fish around the 
UK Overseas Territories of South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands following an intervention from the 
Secretary of State. The suite of cases investigated the com-
plex relationship between the Crown, the UK Government 
and the UK Overseas Territories (Hendry and Dickson, 
2011, p 151) but raised the question of whether compen-
sation was due under the UK human rights legislation. 
The court ruled that the Human Rights Act of 1998 did 
not apply because its provisions had not been expressly 
extended to cover the Territory, so compensation was not 
due.
The case of Jersey Fishermen’s Association Limited and 
Others v States of Guernsey [2008] 1 Law Reports of the 
Commonwealth 198 (Westlaw, 2018d), did not directly 
challenge the ability of a state to amend a licensing sys-
tem. The Sea Fish Licensing (Guernsey) Ordinance 2003 
purported to expand Guernsey’s licensing powers from 
the 3-mile to the 12-mile limit. These powers were exer-
cised so that fishermen from nearby Jersey and other 
commercial interests from the UK found their interests 
damaged. On appeal the Privy Council found that the 
Guernsey authorities did not have the power to make leg-
islation with extra-territorial effect. This ruling resulted 
in compensation being paid to the adversely affected 
thought to run to millions of pounds (Guernsey Press, 
2011), a significant sum for a small island community. This 
compensation would have flowed from interference with 
“possessions” of the affected parties by the erroneous leg-
islation; however, the payment was settled out of court, so 
the status of the affected licences was not decided.
In the UKAFPO case, the UK government tried to real-
locate unused English fishing quota from the larger 
offshore vessels of the POs to the smaller vessels of the 
inshore fishing fleet. Despite confirming that the fish 
were a public resource6 (UKAFPO v Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2013]; Courts and 
Tribunals Judiciary, 2018, para 100) and confirming that 
there was no substantive legitimate expectation, Justice 
Cranston did confirm (“for better or worse”) that quota 
was a “possession” for the purposes of human rights leg-
islation, but that because the quota was unused it had 
no value and therefore did not qualify for compensation 
resulting from its reallocation (Appleby and Pieraccini, 
2012). This case achieved the result of permitting the 
immediate reallocation of a relatively small amount (to 
the value of the UK wide fishery) of £4 million of unused 
quota, but by confirming that quota was a possession, the 
implication is that compensation may be due to affected 
quota holders if quota which was historically used was 
reallocated. In short, the court confirmed quota was an 
individual right. Of course, the level of compensation due 
would be dependent on the nature and extent of quota, 
something which remains frustratingly poorly defined.
In reality the combination of human rights claims and 
the inadvertent creation of “possessions” by poorly con-
ceived and even more poorly regulated licensing regimes 
is having the effect of granting “squatters’ rights” over 
public property. In the process, rights are being created 
in the public fishery that have the effect of creating the 
sort of “tortuous and ungodly jumble” of laws about which 
Oliver Cromwell complained in the seventeenth century 
(Church, 2013, p 175). Over 20 years since the House of 
Commons demanded urgent action, it is still impossible 
to say with any clarity who owns what and for how long.
Academic literature in the area tends to assume some 
sort of smooth continuum with state ownership at one 
end and sole ownership at the other:
“It is widely accepted that the design of property 
rights plays a key role in determining the value of 
natural resource stocks. On one end of the rights 
spectrum is open access, the regime under which 
complete dissipation of the stock’s value may ensue. 
On the other end is sole ownership, which provides 
ideal conditions for maximizing the value of the 
stock.” (Deacon et al., 2013, p 83)
The UK case suggests that this spectrum is not as simple 
as the theorists believe. What we see here is an incredibly 
complex mess of semi-legitimate derivatives and bizarre 
squatters’ rights, combined at some unknown level with 
public ownership. This situation represents the potential 
privatisation of the harvesting rights of a colossal area of 
sea; such a transfer of harvesting rights from the Crown to 
the private sector has not been seen in the UK since the 
Middle Ages, and if permitted to continue will affect the 
shape of UK fishing businesses and coastal communities 
for generations to come.
How irregular this potential privatization is needs to be 
considered in the light of other assets leased or sold by 
the public sector in the UK (Macinko and Bromley, 2002, 
make similar observations in relation to the US system). 
The Crown Estate Commissioners is the body tasked with 
controlling many Crown assets. It is permitted to dispose 
of property but (under section 2 of the Crown Estate Act 
1961) only at best market value or for some identifiable 
charitable purpose (section 3). Similar duties are placed 
on local authorities when disposing of property under 
section 123 of the Local Government Act (Great Britain, 
1972). This codification is also similar to the public trust 
doctrine in the US (Sax, 1969). It is almost impossible 
to conceive of a circumstance where disposal on a “first 
come first served” basis with no payment to the public on 
uncertain terms would be permissible for assets managed 
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by the Crown Estate Commissioners and must cast doubt 
on the arrangement of the whole UK quota manage-
ment system. Is it reasonable to dispose of a public asset 
for a three-year track record on unknown terms? It is a 
sobering thought that were trustees to allocate resources 
under their control to private individuals in this fashion 
the trustees would likely be considered negligent. In the 
case of Re Olive (1886) 34 Chancery Division 70 (Westlaw, 
2018e), trustees who failed to get an adequate valuation 
of a property investment were forced to make up the dif-
ference of a failed investment from their own pockets. We 
submit that giving away public assets, without extensive 
valuation advice, and without clear terms for the disposal, 
would be similarly negligent.
A clearer definition of UK fishing rights would also 
be desirable, as UK waters are becoming increasingly 
crowded. Developments in wind farms, undersea cabling 
infrastructure and subsea oil and gas extraction impact 
on fishing rights, and there is bound to be dispute over 
the relative nature of each industry’s rights and obli-
gations. Such disputes will be exceptionally difficult 
while the rights fishers operate under remain so poorly 
defined.
6. Future directions
The UKAFPO judgment that FQA has become a possession 
under human rights legislation, and thus an individual 
right, seriously hinders the discretion of fisheries manage-
ment in the UK. There is some hope for the government 
in that this decision is a first instance, and it may be pos-
sible to overturn that judgment on appeal or under differ-
ent conditions. However, primary legislation is required 
to resolve exactly what quota, vessel licences, “entitle-
ments”, days at sea and the rest are and establish a proper 
mechanism for the disposal of the asset and safeguard the 
public interest in the resource. Otherwise the courts will 
continue to try to define these rights on an ad hoc basis, 
depending on which cases are presented to court and the 
arguments deployed for those singular circumstances. The 
complexity and consequences of these court decisions 
make the court a particularly inappropriate forum for the 
creation of law in this area.
While the system maintains its current form, fisheries 
managers will need to continue using what mechanisms 
they can, and (because of the expense and delay) where 
they can, avoid court. The recent end of another trans-
ferable quota system in the UK—that of milk (European 
Commission, 2015)—offers one example of a potential 
future for the UK’s FQA fishing right that may not have 
been considered by the industry. Holding an FQA entitles 
the holder to the opportunity to go out and catch fish to 
a specific value in weight of fish that varies subject to EU 
and UK annual calculations and negotiations. Therefore, 
the value of an individual FQA fluctuates, just as the value 
of sterling fluctuates since we departed from the gold 
standard. There is no “fish standard” and so, although the 
debate around ownership has until now revolved around 
the idea that an FQA—as the name suggests—is a share 
“fixed” by value or by portion (e.g., 1 FQA might be 1% of 
UK TAC), in reality it is neither.
Despite the UKAFPO decision, which defines FQA as a 
possession, the exact legal status of FQA is still unknown, 
so there are still potentially further options open to the UK 
fisheries administrations to regain some control over its 
distribution. For instance the administrations are poten-
tially at liberty to create additional FQA which is kept back 
from the main allocation and which could be distributed 
to third parties, while the original holder maintains their 
share of the initial allocation. Indeed, this policy has been 
adopted in Scotland (Anon, 2017, 13 February). In effect 
the value of the original FQA is purposefully watered 
down through inflation. This solution is clearly not opti-
mal, as it remains liable to legal challenge and does not 
deal with the initial extra-legal nature of the original allo-
cation. Other options include the gradual renationaliza-
tion of the resource or potentially cancelling the system 
altogether and distributing access to the fishery by some 
other means, although this latter approach is more likely 
to result in legal challenge and would have significant 
impact because of the leveraged nature of many fishing 
businesses and the use of quota as collateral.
However the UK and the DAs may choose to implement 
quota reform, there is a sense that the UKAFPO decision, 
in noting that used quota had become a possession, has 
given tacit assurance to the view that quota is an indi-
vidual right and thus a compensatable interest. There is 
still scope under the forthcoming Fisheries Bill to reform 
the right itself and set out plainly the terms of holding 
quota, such as the length of the holding, its transferabil-
ity, the recovery of administrative costs, any compensation 
due on cancellation and even the potential to charge a 
resource rent, but the terms of any formal right created 
will need careful drafting to avoid judicial intervention.
6.1 Brexit
Perhaps of interest is the much-publicised role that quota 
issues, and the legislation blamed for them, the CFP, 
played in Brexit (e.g., see BBC, 20 May 2016, “Fishing for 
Leave Group Launches”; The Guardian, 1 June 2016, “Salt 
in their veins and fire in their bellies: fishermen battling 
for Brexit”; The Sun, 17 April 2017, “British skippers want 
to see loathed fishing quotas scrapped post-Brexit…”). In a 
poll conducted by Aberdeen University, 92% of fishermen 
intended to vote to leave the EU (McAngus, 2016). How-
ever, a significant feature of the struggle faced by the UK 
fleet was a product of the UK’s market-based and poorly 
regulated quota distribution, rather than European Law in 
and of itself. Undoubtedly other factors (such as the distri-
bution of TAC between member states) have a role to play, 
but as far as the distribution of UK quota is concerned, 
including the extensive ownership of quota by foreign 
companies, there is a sense that the European Union insti-
tutions were being blamed for a problem that was “made 
in Britain.” It was, after all, the UK government’s compe-
tence to allocate quota to fishing businesses, not the EU’s.
However, Brexit, which for so many areas of UK policy 
has created considerable uncertainty, has resulted in the 
UK government developing primary legislation in this area 
with its proposed Fisheries Bill (HM Government, 2017). 
The key purpose of the Bill is to “control access to its waters 
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and set UK fishing quotas once it has left the EU.” There is 
therefore a chance that management and distribution of 
quota could form a key part of this legislation, and this 
represents an opportunity to design effective legal mecha-
nisms and incorporate the controls required. Indeed (as 
we made clear above) the UK should have been progress-
ing a Fisheries Bill anyway. However, the devolution of 
fisheries management within its EEZ, to Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, means that the passage of any sig-
nificant reforms will need to be coordinated between the 
four nations of the UK, which will undoubtedly add a layer 
of complexity.
If there are lessons to be drawn from Brexit for other 
states (other than to be very careful about constitutional 
referenda), then these stem from the sheer constitutional 
complexity of managing a relatively small industry by such 
a Byzantine system. The EU has “exclusive competence” 
for fisheries policy (Commission v United  Kingdom Case 
804/79; Eur-Lex, 2018). In the bald wording of the case:
“member states are therefore no longer entitled to 
exercise any power of their own in the matter of 
conservation measures in the waters under their  
jurisdiction.”
Yet fisheries need to be well managed at a local level via 
a range of technical measures. They are not the sort of 
common property that lends itself to centralised man-
agement, and the EU system itself has been criticized 
for attempting to micromanage (Al-Fattal, 2009). In the 
UK this situation has been compounded by devolution. 
The result is that fisheries legislation emanates from a 
complex wedding cake of overlapping bureaucracies. 
Fisheries managers can be forgiven, to some extent, for 
overlooking the accidental privatisation of the resource, 
because navigating effective stock conservation manage-
ment measures through the system is very difficult, and 
under these circumstances the promise of an effective 
panacea can be very attractive. Rather than setting stra-
tegic objectives, as the EU does with conservation legisla-
tion, exclusive competence means that the EU has total 
control unless it has delegated some aspect to member 
states. (In addition, in the UK, some management has 
then also been delegated to: its devolved administrations; 
a quango, the Marine Management Organisation; and, 
for England, Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authori-
ties.) The EU’s exclusive competence means that for some 
management measures, for instance permitting electric 
fishing (Stokstad, 2018), when rules need to be amended, 
it potentially affects the whole of Europe, and inevitably 
involves international wrangling. So, while UK fishers are 
wrong to blame the EU for any issues relating to the allo-
cation of UK fishing quota, which are a UK competence, 
the EU is certainly responsible for creating an overly com-
plex system for such a small industry.
But Brexit will not necessarily rid the UK of institutional 
complexity. In the turmoil of the tight timelines that the 
UK has set for itself to leave the EU, it is perfectly possi-
ble for the resulting bureaucratic tangle to be even more 
dysfunctional than the current system, with the added 
problem for managers of unfamiliarity. As yet, with the 
UK on the cusp of leaving the EU, there is little sense as 
to how it will reorganise its bureaucracy both in terms of 
its ongoing relations with the EU and the heavily politi-
cized relations between the UK government and the DAs. 
There are many messages from the Brexit vote, which will 
doubtlessly be unpicked by scholars, but the combination 
of a complicated bureaucracy and an over-concentration 
of control over quota has certainly fed an unstable politi-
cal environment.
7. Conclusion
As the issues presented above illustrate, the piecemeal 
introduction of the panacea of transferable quotas to 
manage fisheries has, in the UK, had significant legal and 
economic consequences that make management very dif-
ficult for government administrators. Despite the best of 
intentions, the bounded rationality of governors left them 
unable to predict the impact of the ITQ system and how 
it would mesh with existing legal frameworks, with the 
resultant predicament of a dissatisfactory management 
system that is discriminatory, complicated and difficult to 
change. This inflexibility is particularly important given 
the importance of adaptive management in fisheries, 
whereby interventions are approached as experiments to 
be adjusted in response to performance (Armitage et al., 
2015). The inability to change any policy direction makes 
it a very risky experiment. As our case exemplifies, if fish-
eries policy is to be truly holistic and adaptive, its design 
must include legal knowledge, as well as social, economic 
and environmental.
These issues should be borne in mind for any fisheries 
managers considering implementing ITQs. It is both dif-
ficult and absolutely essential to create watertight legal 
frameworks for an ITQ system, and the existing legal 
frameworks around property mean that if ITQ legislation 
is not properly drafted then government loses control of a 
public asset in a windfall give-away. Piecemeal resolution 
of (the highly predictable) resultant disputes in the courts 
is not a professional method of establishing a property-
rights based system. ITQ systems must be very carefully 
drafted to recognise the essential public ownership of the 
fishery (such as the Crown Estate model in the UK or the 
public trust model in the US). The creation of inflexible 
(or unknown, in the case of the UK) property rights will 
dramatically decrease the potential for administrators to 
adapt management systems, either to suit changing exter-
nal circumstances (such as ecological or climate fluctua-
tions) or in the face of poor performance.
Despite the extent to which property rights are depend-
ent upon law to work, these legal issues are rarely, if ever, 
considered in the economic theory that drives market-
based fisheries management. The lesson from the UK 
experience is that despite the legal blindness of much 
resource economics, the application of economic theory 
should not outrun its legal foundations. This omission 
is frustrating as the disposal of public assets to the pri-
vate sector is well understood; it is standard practice in 
almost every other arm of public administration. Indeed, 
for a lawyer to advise on the disposal of assets without 
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ensuring appropriate valuations and without insisting on 
formal written terms would almost certainly be negligent, 
and for such a transaction to take place with no payment 
to the public owners there would have to be demonstra-
ble public benefit.
For many in the fishing industry a combination of exclu-
sive competence of fisheries by the EU and a complex 
management system have engendered a significant sense 
of disenfranchisement. It is easy to see how quota, and 
the concentration of its ownership, has played a part in 
that narrative. Although the CFP has improved in recent 
years, it remains deeply unpopular, and the severe dis-
satisfaction of UK fishers was amply demonstrated in the 
overwhelming numbers in which fishers voted for Brexit. 
Government can only operate with the consent of the gov-
erned, and while to some extent effective management 
measures are often unpopular, both the UK and EU did not 
monitor the effect on UK fishing businesses and coastal 
communities of its laws and regulations or, crucially, bring 
those communities with them. However “successful” ITQs 
may be, clever technocratic solutions need buy-in for 
those impacted if they are not to trigger a public outcry; 
ultimately, like all legal devices, ITQ is about managing 
people, not property rights. It is possible that in the new 
Fisheries Bill some of these issues will be redressed, but 
only time will tell whether the UK can unravel the tangled 
legal knots that a laissez faire approach to ITQ has created.
Data Accessibility Statements
The data used were from a publically available UK govern-
ment repository: https://www.fqaregister.service.gov.uk/.
Notes
 1 Of the UK’s Overseas Territories and Crown Dependen-
cies, only the UK itself and Gibraltar are members of 
the EU.
 2 Despite the geographical spread of this potential fish-
ery, statistics show that most catches by UK-registered 
vessels occur in what would be the UK EEZ, particu-
larly the northern North Sea and West of Scotland (see 
charts 3.7 to 3.15 in Marine Management Organisa-
tion, 2017).
 3 The 23rd is the recently introduced Coastal PO, dis-
cussed later in this section.
 4 FQA Register: https://www.fqaregister.service.gov.uk/.
 5 Even though such checks are a legal requirement under 
Article 18, Regulation 1379/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and failure to imple-
ment clearly undermines Member States Article 17, 
CFP implementation.
 6 This confirmation is certainly an error in law, as fish 
are ferae naturae and ownerless until captured; it is the 
fishery which potentially could be in public ownership.
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